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Using Comparative and Transnational Corporate Law to
Teach Corporate Social Responsibility
Franklin A. Gevurtz*
When a professor teaching corporate law, such as myself, thinks about
reforming the curricula in order to reinforce the ethical principle of the lawyer as
a "public citizen," the topic of corporate social responsibility comes to the fore.
How can we get our students in corporate law classes to thoughtfully consider the
role of corporate law and corporate lawyers in ensuring large corporations act in
a way that benefits, rather than harms, employees, customers, and the broader
community and environment within which the firm operates? It is the thesis of
this essay that introducing comparative corporate law-in other words, looking at
non-United States ("U.S.") company law-and examining the impact of the
cross-border activities of multinational companies provides a superior means of
accomplishing this goal.
Before developing this thesis, it may be useful to address a normative
question: should corporate law care about corporate social responsibility? There
is a strong current in academic commentary-particularly from followers of neo-
classical economic reasoning-that the purpose of a business corporation is
solely to produce goods and services in the most efficient manner so as to
maximize wealth for its owners (shareholders), and that, in this manner,
corporations maximize wealth for society as a whole.' It is, of course, true that
business corporations are engines of economic activity whose purposes are to
produce and sell goods and services, and that, all other factors being equal, the
most efficient production and sale of goods and services equals a wealthier (if not
always happier) society.
Nevertheless, this narrow view ignores a couple of critical considerations.
One is distributional. Corporate law impacts the question of who gets how much
of the wealth generated by corporations. Law has a legitimate concern not only
with the total wealth produced by corporations, but also in helping to ensure that
the distribution of this wealth reflects societal values-whether this value is
equality or, less ambitious, that distributions reflect fully informed contracts
rather than opportunistic exploitation. The other consideration lies in the need to
be careful in defining and measuring the efficient production of wealth. To use a
* Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Director,
Pacific McGeorge Global Center for Business & Development.
1. E.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profit, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 17.
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simple illustration, if a company produces and sells lethal toys for children, few
would say that this activity has produced wealth for society. Similarly, if a
company's production significantly damages the environment, one cannot
measure the impact of the company's activity on the total wealth of society
without subtracting the damage to the environment in the calculation.
Admittedly, one might argue that such concerns are the province of laws (such as
product safety and environmental protection) other than corporate law. Yet, to
assume that corporate law-the laws governing the selection, duties, and
liabilities of those in charge of corporations and of the owners of the
corporation-is irrelevant to these concerns is a bit like assuming that the laws
governing the election of representatives in a democracy are irrelevant to the
policies the government will ultimately follow.2
To turn from the normative to the concrete, how does corporate law address
issues of corporate social responsibility, or, more broadly, the impact of
corporations and the way they are governed on our society? This essay will
explore three areas. In the first part, it will explore the shareholder primacy
versus stakeholder model debate. This debate asks whether the purpose of a
business corporation, as reflected in the duties of corporate directors and the
manner of their selection, is simply to maximize wealth for its shareholders
(within the limits imposed by laws generally), or whether the purpose, as
reflected in the selection and duties of directors, is to promote the welfare of all
those who have a stake in the corporation-including employees, customers,
creditors and the broader community within which the company operates. In the
second part, this essay will look more specifically at distributional issues-
specifically at the role of corporate law in limiting the ability of those in charge
of a corporation to seize a disproportionate share of the wealth generated by the
company. Finally, in the third part, this essay will consider the impact of limited
liability for the corporation's owners on the ability of other laws (such as product
safety and environmental protection laws) to ensure responsible corporate
conduct.
In each case, we will see that confining the discussion to laws and companies
within the United States can result in a sterile classroom exercise in which
students fail to fully appreciate the concrete possibilities for better approaches. It
also fails to fully inform the students of the importance of corporate social
responsibility in a global economy in which the actions of foreign multinationals
can impact persons in the United States. By contrast, introducing discussion of
other nations' company laws, and of the impact of multinational corporations,
2. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities,
101 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROc. 3, 45-46 (2007) (for a more extended discussion of why external regulation of
corporations cannot completely prevent negative corporate actions irrespective of who owns and controls the
corporation).
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 24
enlivens the classroom discussion by opening the students' minds to alternate
approaches and to the totality of what is at stake.
I. MAKING REAL THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY VERSUS
STAKEHOLDER MODEL DEBATE
Discussions of the topic of corporate social responsibility often begin on a
broad level with the decades' old debate3 at the intersection of the purpose for
which business corporations exist and the duties of corporate boards of directors
(the persons with ultimate responsibility for managing the corporation).4
Specifically, do business corporations exist simply to make money for their
shareholders so long as the company acts within the law-often referred to as the
"shareholder primacy," or "shareholder wealth maximization," norm?5 If so, then
the duty of directors is to do what they can to maximize profits for the
shareholders, subject only to avoiding those actions by the company that violate
specific laws. Or, is the purpose of the corporation to promote the welfare of all
those with a stake in its activities-including employees, customers, creditors
and the broader community within which the company operates-often referred
to as the "stakeholder model" or "stakeholder theory?"7 If so, then directors have
the discretion, if not the duty, to sacrifice maximum profits for the shareholder in
order to promote or protect the interests of these other stakeholders.8
The typical corporate law casebook9 introduces students to this debate
through the classic opinion in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.l0 The Dodge brothers
were minority shareholders in Ford Motor Co." Henry Ford owned a majority of
the outstanding stock and dominated the board.1 2 Ford Motor Co. at this time was
unbelievably successful. 3 The Dodge brothers sued after Henry Ford announced
3. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1146-48 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1365-68 (1932).
4. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2011); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (1979) [hereinafter
M.B.C.A.].
5. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW, 45, 45, 48 (2002).
6. E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 440-41 (2001).
7. E.g., Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modem Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 641,662-63 (2007).
8. E.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REv. 247, 250-53 (1999).
9. E.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSAYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 270 (7th ed. 2009).
10. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
11. Id. at 669-70.
12. Id. at 669, 671.
13. Id. at 670-71, 680.
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that the corporation would not pay any more special dividends, but, instead,
would retain the extra earnings for expansion.' 4 Hence, much of the opinion deals
with the discretion of directors when it comes to declaring dividends.'5
What transforms Dodge into a classic is a side discussion the court undertook
regarding the corporation's expansion plans. Statements by Henry Ford, both in
and out of court, suggest that his reason for expanding the business was not to
maximize profits, but, rather, stemmed from his desire to implement his
economic and social views.' 6 Specifically, Henry Ford expressed the opinion that
the company should lower the price of its cars and expand its production, not to
increase profits, but in order to enable more Americans to own a car and to
provide employment for more persons.'7 The court took a different view of the
permissible goals of a business corporation. 8 Such a corporation (as opposed to
an entity organized as a non-profit corporation) exists, the court explained,
"primarily for the profit of the stockholders."' 9 The directors have great discretion
in choosing the means toward that end, but the directors breach their duty if they
act to change the end objective itself from profiting the shareholders to seeking to
benefit others.20 Countless corporate law professors use this language in Dodge to
show their students that corporate law in the United States adheres to a
shareholder primacy norm.' This, in turn, becomes the launching point for
classroom debate as to the normative merits of this rule of corporate law.
To be honest, I have found this debate as so presented to be largely a sterile
academic exercise. The reason is it misconstrues corporate law in the United
States because it misconstrues the impact of Dodge and cases like it. The court in
Dodge ordered the payment of a special dividend; but this was only because Ford
Motor Co. had plenty of money both to expand and to pay the dividend.22 Yet,
critically, the court refused to block the corporation's expansion plans, despite
what the court had to say concerning Henry Ford's express motivations for those
plans. 23 The court felt that the expansion plans might ultimately serve a business
purpose and refused to substitute the court's judgment for the business expertise
of the directors.24 In other words, the court actually allowed Henry Ford to forgo
14. Id. at 671.
15. Id. at 682-85.
16. Id. at 671-73.




21. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus.
REv. 163, 166 (2008) (arguing against this practice as providing an inaccurate view of corporate law).
22. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685.
23. Id. at 684.
24. Id.
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obedience to the shareholder primacy norm on the off-chance that the
25
shareholders might end up better off anyway.
The practical upshot of cases like Dodge is that, by and large, courts have not
scrutinized business decisions to see whether directors sacrificed profit
maximization to advance the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the
community.26 Instead, the courts almost invariably accept some rationale as to
how the business decisions were in the long-range interest of the shareholders. 7
Indeed, even in those few cases in which outspoken individuals (like Henry Ford)
might ignore legal advice and express "profit be damned" sentiments, courts
seem willing, on their own, to conjure up profit maximizing rationalizations for
the directors' actions 8 Conversely, other than a duty to protect the interest of
creditors in the event of insolvency, courts in the United States disclaim any duty
of directors toward other stakeholders in the corporation. 29 The upshot is that the
balancing of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders in the
corporation, as a matter of corporate law, is pretty much left to the discretion of
the board.0
Proponents of a stakeholder model over the shareholder primacy norm tend
to applaud this deference granted by courts to directors on the ground that it gives
directors the ability to mediate between the various stakeholders in the
corporation.3' One problem, however, is that if the law does not, in reality,
generally command placing the interest of the shareholders first, practical politics
might. Of all the stakeholders, the shareholders alone vote to elect the directors
under corporate law in the United States.32 Accordingly, the discretion to mediate
between stakeholders is lodged in a group picked by only one of the stakeholders.
A common response to this rather fundamental problem of implementing the
stakeholder model by vesting unchecked discretion in a board elected by only
one of the stakeholders is to note that barriers exist in public corporations to
shareholders effectively exercising their electoral franchise.33 Specifically, under
25. Id.
26. E.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 775 (2005).
27. E.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
28. E.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (the court speculates that
helping the neighborhood by not installing lights in a professional baseball park will be better for the
corporation by preserving property values, including the value of the ball park).
29. E.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
30. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. About the only exception exists in the takeover
context when the board is choosing between two cash bids for the company. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
31. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 320-22; Kent Greenfield, The Impact of "Going Private" on
Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 86 (2008) ("If management is more
autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy to allocate more of the corporate surplus to
employees and other stakeholders.").
32. See, e.g., M.B.C.A. §§ 7.28(a), 8.03(c); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 21 1(b) (West 2011).
33. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 252-56.
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the corporate law system of shareholders voting at the shareholder meeting in
person or by proxy, shareholders would need to incur significant expense
soliciting proxies from their fellow shareholders in order to put forth a slate of
candidates in opposition to those proposed by the current incumbents-whose
proxy solicitation is paid for by the corporation." This gives shareholders-for
whom it is far easier to simply sell their shares if dissatisfied with current
management-limited incentive to do anything other than rubber stamp the slate
put forth by the incumbents.3" Relying on this reality to prevent the shareholder
franchise from producing shareholder primacy in the running of the corporation,
proponents of the stakeholder model in the United States may be led to oppose
corporate reform proposals that attempt to empower the shareholders in the
exercise of their voting rights, such as by allowing shareholders to place their
nominees' names on the company's proxy solicitation.1
6
This, in turn, leads one to ask who actually selects directors if this is not done
by the shareholders. The answer is the corporation's management, especially the
CEO.3 Yet, this means that discretion to mediate between corporate stakeholders
is still left in the hands of a group selected by only one of the stakeholders-this
being the senior corporate management. The resulting power balance may do
more to enrich senior management through lucrative compensation than it does to
help employees, customers, or the community and environment. 38
Are there alternate corporate law approaches to which we can introduce our
students that have real impact in protecting the interest of other stakeholders of
the corporation, such as employees? In fact, there are if we look to corporate law
outside the United States.
To begin with, we might ask students whether it is possible to have a law in
which directors do not simply have discretion, but rather have an enforceable
duty to consider the interests of other stakeholders such as employees. The
typical discussion of such a proposal in a U.S. law school classroom is likely to
dismiss the idea as completely impractical. The worry is that directors will be
sued no matter what they do-as every decision is likely to favor one stakeholder
over another, prompting the unhappy stakeholders to sue.39 Exploration of the law
in other nations, however, might prompt students to reconsider this facile
34. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.3b, 207-09 (2d ed. 2010).
35. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675, 682-83
(2007) (reporting the small number of contested proxy solicitations).
36. E.g., Lynn A. Stout, Op-Ed., Corporations Shouldn't Be Democracies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007,
at A17.
37. E.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic
Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. Sei. Q. 60, 78 (1995).
38. See Antoine Reberioux, Does Shareholder Primacy Lead to a Decline in Managerial
Accountability?, 31 CAMBRIDGE. J. ECON. 507, 508 (2007).
39. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion,
45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2270 (1990).
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assumption. Specifically, one can ask the students to consider the law in the
Netherlands.
Under Article 26 of the Netherlands Enterprise Councils Act, worker
councils can challenge decisions by a Dutch corporation's management before a
specialized court in Amsterdam.4' The court is empowered to block
implementation of the decision if the entrepreneur, in balancing the interests
involved, "could not in all fairness have arrived at the said decision. 4' The court
has applied this standard to block corporations from closing down divisions and
profitable (and even unprofitable) subsidiaries in the Netherlands. 2 Commonly in
these cases, the court's objection to the decision's reasonableness stems not from
the decision's substantive merits, but from the process that management utilized
in making the decision-for example, whether the management had explored
other alternatives.43
Of course, this check on process still leaves the ultimate balancing of
interests to the discretion of the board. Is there a way to change the composition
of the board so it includes persons more inclined to favorably consider the
interests of employees or other stakeholders beyond the shareholders and senior
management? Here, once again, other nations show such a thing is possible.
Corporate laws in Germany and a number of other European nations provide
for employee representation on corporate boards.4 The label for this is "co-
determination"-since the notion is that both capital and labor are thereby
involved in determining corporate policy.4 Looking at Germany for the most
noted example, under the 1952 Works Council Constitution Act, all German
firms with more than 500 employees must have a board (unless the firm is
conducted as a sole proprietorship or a partnership composed of natural persons),
one-third of whose members are elected by the employees of the firm who work
in Germany.46 The 1976 Co-Determination Act requires all German firms with
more than 2000 employees to allow the employees working in Germany to elect
half of the members of the supervisory board (the size of which depends upon
how many persons the company employs). 47 The ability to elect half the board
40. MODEL RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR WORK COUNCILS, Article 26(5) (2003) (Neth.).
41. Id.
42. E.g., Eddy Wymeersch, A Status Report on Corporate Governance in Some Continental European
States, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH
1045, 1082 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, Corporate Governance: The
Dutch Experience, 16 TRANSNAT' L LAW. 63, 69-70 (2002).
43. van den Muijsenbergh, supra note 42, at 70.
44. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 63 (2006).
45. ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 308 (2010).
46. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution Act], Oct. It, 1952, Bundesgesezblatt,
Teil I [BGBL. I] at 681 (Ger.). In 2004, the DrittleGB replaced the BetrVG, leaving the substantive provisions
the same. E.g., CAHN & DONALD, supra note 45, at 308-09.
47. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Co-Determination Act], May 4, 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I
[BGBL. I] at 1153 (Ger.).
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under the 1976 Act does not quite give parity to employees, however, given that
the representatives of the shareholders on the board can elect the chair, who has
the power to cast a tie-breaking vote. 8
Not only does introducing comparative corporate law demonstrate to the
students that corporate laws actually exist under which stakeholder interests
receive real protection, but the fact that Dutch, German, and other foreign
corporations subject to such laws still manage to thrive, demonstrates that such
laws are not completely impractical. Indeed, there have been a number of efforts
to study empirically the impact of co-determination on corporate profitability.49
The results are mixed and subject to the typical social scientist disputes about
appropriate methodology. Some studies, however, show an improvement in
corporate functioning of companies with co-determination as a result of greater
employee acceptance of corporate decisions.5'
II. ESTABLISHING AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO ISSUES OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY
One issue of social justice that seems not to have attracted as much attention
in corporate law classes in the United States is the growing income inequality in
this country. The top one percent of earners in the United States went from
receiving less than 9% of the nation's pretax income in 1976 to receiving 23.5%
in 2007.2 While addressing such income inequality at first glance seems the
subject of a course in tax policy, the role that compensation of senior corporate
executives appears to have played in this phenomenon 3 makes this relevant to
corporate law. Specifically, CEOs in major U.S. corporations went from making
42 times the earnings of their companies' average worker in 1980 to making 531
times as much as the average worker in 2001 .
Of course, corporate law classes will address the limits (such as they are)
imposed by corporate law on executive compensation in the United States.5 In
48. Id. (shareholder representatives elect the board chair in the event that two-thirds of the entire board
cannot agree on who should be chair).
49. E.g., Elmar Gerum & Helmut Wagner, Economics of Labor Co-Determination in View of Corporate
Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING
RESEARCH 341,348-51 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
50. Id.
51. E.g., Warner Kirsch, Wolfgang Scholl & Gunter Paul, Mitbestimmung in der Unternehmenspraxis
(Munich 1984), cited in Elmar Gerum & Helmut Wagner, Economics of Labor Co-Determination in View of
Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE STATE OF THE ART AND
EMERGING RESEARCH 441 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
52. E.g., Frank Rich, Op-Ed, Who Will Stand Up to the Superrich?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, at
WK8.
53. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER TAKE-ALL POLmCs: How WASHINGTON MADE THE
RICH RICHER-AND TURNED iTS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 39, 61-66 (2010).
54. E.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Our Banana Republic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at WK10.
55. E.g., KLEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 376-95.
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such a discussion, a professor with a broader societal view might raise the impact
of executive compensation upon income inequality in the United States. Here
too, however, such a discussion may come across as an abstract exercise unless
the students have some basis for comparing whether there is a realistic
alternative. Once again, comparing the corporate law in other countries can
demonstrate there is an alternative.
Specifically, the gap in the United States between the compensation of CEOs
and other senior management, as compared with compensation for the average
worker in their company, dwarfs the differential found in many other countries6
For example, in Germany, the average CEO received only 11 times the pay of an
average employee in his or her company in 200. While this difference between
the situation in the United States and in other countries no doubt results from a
variety of factors, it is certainly possible that corporate law plays a role.
Having students read a pair of cases decided at about the same time by courts
in the United States and Germany illustrates the role corporate law might play. In
In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, Delaware courts held
directors of The Walt Disney Company did not breach their duty--despite having
approved or acquiesced in actions that resulted in Disney paying around $130
million to the former president of the company in exchange for a year
accomplishing little as Disney's number two executive. 58 By contrast, in The
Mannesmann Case, the German Federal Supreme Court held that directors of the
German company, Mannesmann AG, breached their duty to the company when
they awarded a bonus of approximately $17 million to the outgoing CEO-
whose actions apparently played an important role in gaining over $50 billion for
the Mannesmann shareholders.59
Interestingly, the difference in outcome between these two cases is not tied to
a difference in the legal rule applied by the two courts. In both cases, the courts
applied a standard of deference to decisions by the directors, which, in the United
States, is known as the "business judgment rule." 6 Moreover, one might attempt
to reconcile the two courts' application of this standard by pointing to differences
in the situations before the courts-Disney involved termination pay provided for
under an employment contract, while Mannesmann involved a gratuitous bonus.
Even so, looking at the cases carefully, it is difficult to shake the conclusion that
had Disney been a German corporation, or Mannesmann been incorporated in
56. Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing and Beyond: Implications for Workers, 76 ST. JOHNS L.
REv. 815, 829 n.63 (2002).
57. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 331 n.86 (2004).
58. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), aff'g 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005).
59. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, 4 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 522 (524), (2006) (Ger.).
60. Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 52; 4 BGHZ 522 (Ger.).
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Delaware, the results would have been different. Specifically, the skepticism with
which the German court in Mannesmann dissected the question of whether
paying the challenged bonus could produce any offsetting advantage for the
61
company seems at odds with the deferential way in which the Delaware court
accepted the board's actions in Disney.62 Indeed, in Zupnick v. Goizueta, the
Delaware Court of Chancery applied a highly deferential interpretation of the
business judgment rule in order to uphold the sort of bonus based upon
extraordinary past accomplishment, which had been condemned by
Mannesmann.63
The difference in these courts' application of the business judgment rule to
executive compensation may, in turn, stem from broader differences in
philosophy which students can consider. The greater apparent willingness of
German judges to second-guess business decisions in Mannesmann and other
German cases is symptomatic of a political and economic philosophy of greater
government intervention in managing economic matters, 64 while the deference of
Delaware courts is consistent with a philosophy more willing to put trust in
private ordering and markets.65 Moreover, the reaction of the German judges in
Mannesmann also may reflect, as well as preserve, a culture both within German
companies and in the broader society that is much more attuned to equality in
wealth distribution than is the corporate and broader social culture in the United
States.66
61. The court went so far as to dismiss the incentive effect that a termination bonus might have on the
remaining managers because the takeover meant a change in management, even though the company taking
Mannesmann over had approved the bonus and so its newly installed management team might have been given
an incentive for good performance by the bonus. For a more extended discussion, see Franklin A. Gevurtz,
Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453,464 (2007).
62. The court dismisses both the unfortunate incentive effect of a contract under which the executive
gets more money for being terminated (so long as it is not for egregious cause) than if he stays, and the prospect
that Disney might have attempted to utilize uncertainties about its right to terminate for cause without paying
the termination claims to negotiate a lower payout. Id. at 465-66.
63. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch. 1997).
64. E.g., Harold Baum, Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE
U.S. 6-8 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 2005).
65. E.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("If the
shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a director produces in the
good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders should have elected other directors.").
66. E.g., Umfrage: Gerechtigkeit vor Freiheit, ZEIT ONLINE (Dec. 2, 2006, 9:44 AM), http://www.
zeit.de/news/artikelI2006/12/02/83097.xml (article reporting on a survey by the German newspaper, Welt am
Sonntag, which found that a majority of Germans (58% versus 34%) prefer "social justice"-i.e. income
equality-to economic freedom).
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HI. BRINGING HOME THE CONSEQUENCES OF LIMITED LIABILITY FOR
MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
One argument against addressing corporate social responsibility concerns
within the realm of corporate law is that other areas of law should address this
issue. In other words, employment, labor, and occupational safety laws should
protect corporate employees, consumer protection laws should protect consumers
in their dealings with corporations, environmental laws should protect the
environment from detrimental corporate activities, and so on.67 Yet, such laws
can only compel responsible corporate behavior to the extent jurisdictions can
force companies to comply with such laws or else pay the full damages and fines
resulting from the violation. Here, however, the basic rule of corporate law that
the shareholders (owners) of a corporation are not personally liable for the
company's debts-in other words, have limited liability68-can constrain a
jurisdiction's ability to ensure compliance or full compensation.
A professor can use domestic cases69 or make up hypothetical examples
involving domestic companies to illustrate for students how limited liability may
allow owners of a corporation to externalize costs-including damages and fines
resulting from violation of laws-which the company's activities impose upon
society and so tempt irresponsible corporate actions. Indeed, the recent financial
crisis-in which bank shareholders were able to profit from years of increasing
speculation with depositors' money,70 all leading to massive government bailouts
when the risks came home to roost-illustrates the moral hazard for society,
created, in part, by limited liability. 7' Examples from the global activities of so-
called multinational corporations, however, help the students appreciate the
scope of the problem.
To understand the nature of the problem created by multinational
corporations, it is useful to start by noting that the phrase "multinational
corporation" is something of a misnomer. Specifically, the typical multinational
business enterprise involved in international business transactions is normally not
a single corporation, but rather a group of affiliated corporations tied together in
parent-subsidiary relationships. Under these circumstances, if a subsidiary
67. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor
Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645, 661 (2002).
68. E.g., M.B.C.A. § 6.22.
69. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966) (cab company operating with minimum
liability insurance and few other assets).
70. E.g., William W. Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 653, 720-21 (2010) (banks that took the most risk in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis had the
best stock performance).
71. See generally Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 U. SEATrLE L. REV. 1173, 1179-83 (2010).
72. Kojo Yelpaala, Rethinking the Foreign Direct Investment Process and Incentives in Post-Conflict
Transition Countries, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 23, 41-42 (2010) (multinational enterprises engage in foreign
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conducts its operations in a manner that causes significant environmental
damage, harms its workers through unsafe working conditions, or injures
consumers by selling dangerous products, only the subsidiary's assets may be at
risk to pay the damages. So long as the other affiliated corporations have limited
liability, the bulk of the assets of the multinational business enterprise may be
beyond reach. 73
To give the students a concrete example of the impact of limited liability
with so-called multinational corporations, I use a pair of cases involving a
multinational business enterprise, whose actions resulted in numerous personal
injuries and deaths in a former colony, and whose parent companies, established
under the laws of the mother country, escaped paying damages. Only in this
litigation, the former colony is the United States, and the parent corporations
were English companies. The cases are Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. ,4
and Adams v. Cape Industries.7
These opinions involved an English company (Cape Industries-itself a
subsidiary of another English company, Charter Consolidated), which, through
its subsidiaries, mined asbestos in South Africa and sold the asbestos in other
countries.76 To sell the asbestos in the United States, Cape formed an Illinois
subsidiary." The Illinois subsidiary operated in rented offices, had all of four
employees, 7s and the liability insurance the subsidiary carried (if indeed it carried
any at all) seems to have been woefully inadequate.79 After waves of lawsuits by
persons suffering lung disease from coming into contact with asbestos, Cape
dissolved the Illinois subsidiary, allowed default judgments against itself in the
United States, and then contested jurisdiction when the injured parties attempted
to enforce the judgments in English courts, 0 all the while continuing for several
more years to sell asbestos in the United States through a new, nominally
independent, Liechtenstein corporation.8 ' In the end, the English court refused to
pierce (or "lift" in the English parlance) the corporate veil of the Illinois
subsidiary in order to uphold the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts and enforce the
default judgments against Cape,82 while a U.S. court refused to pierce the
direct investment through subsidiaries).
73. Janis Sarra, Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency
Proceedings, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547, 550 (2009) (separate entities manage assets and operations to reduce the
risk that claims against one subsidiary will reach assets, as claims against one subsidiary will only attach to that
subsidiary in most instances).
74. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cit. 1988).
75. Adams v. Cape Indus. Plc., [19901 Ch. 433 (C.A.) (Eng.).
76. Lake Asbestos, 843 F.2d at 147; Adams, [1990] Ch. 433 at 434 (Eng.).
77. Adams, [1990] Ch. 433 at 434 (Eng.).
78. Id. at 472.
79. Id. at 449.
80. Id. at 434, 449.
81. Id. at450.
82. Id. at 544.
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corporate veil of Cape to enforce the judgments against its parent corporation,
Charter (which appears to have had assets in the United States). 3
What makes this pair of cases so compelling as a classroom experience is not
simply how they introduce the dangers posed by the jurisdictional and liability
limits behind which multinational business enterprises can hide their assets, but
also how they shift from the stereotypical pattern in which U.S. companies are
sued for the acts of their subsidiaries abroad. In so doing, they avoid an
instinctive defensive jingoistic reaction on the part of U.S. law students, who see
the moral hazard posed in the United States by this state of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
These three examples show the power of using comparative corporate law
and the activities of multinational corporations to enrich the typical corporate law
course's consideration of issues of corporate social responsibility. Since
introducing such materials into my Business Associations course, I no longer find
discussion of corporate social responsibility a sterile academic exercise.
83. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988).

